A shortened version of this paper was first published in Elders 1(1), 1992.
Reproduced with the kind permission of Pepar Publications

Age and Citizenship

Neil Thompson

Citizenship is strongly associated with the concept of ‘adulthood’. Children are not generally seen as having the same rights as adults and older people are often treated as though they have ‘passed through’ adulthood and thus lost full rights and dignity. These are examples of ‘ageism’ - personal and institutional discrimination based on the social division of age.

This paper explores the links between power, age and citizenship, on the one hand, and the interaction of different forms of oppression, e.g., gender and age, on the other. The paper concludes by considering the implications of ageism for the theory and practice of welfare professionals.

Introduction

Williams (1989) bemoans the absence, in mainstream social policy, of an appreciation of the significance of structural social divisions such as race and gender. She also acknowledges the impact of oppression based on other social divisions such as age and disability.

Racism and sexism are receiving increasing attention in terms of social policy in general and social work education in particular. For example, the new professional training course for social workers, the DipSW, places great emphasis on the need to develop anti-racist and anti-sexist practice (CCETSW 1989). However, discrimination on the grounds of age has been the focus of far less debate and attention. (Townsend 1986)

Ageism, as this form of discrimination has become known (Butler 1975) has been defined by Fennell, Phillipson and Evers (1988) in the following terms:-

“Ageism means unwarranted application of negative stereotypes to older people.” (p. 97)

Ageism has its roots in both personal behaviour and attitudes, on the one hand, and institutional policies, structures and practices, on the other. As with racism and sexism, the two levels - the personal/attitudinal and the institutional/structural - are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. The factor which bonds the two together is that of ideology - the power of ideas legitimating and sustaining existing power relations.

Ageist ideology is therefore a key aspect of this paper, and in particular its impact on notions of citizenship and rights. Taylor (1989) argues that:-

“Citizenship has not been realised for excluded groups either through the false collectivism of social democratic welfare, or through the consumerist ‘democracy’ of the market.” (p.19)

Ageism is precisely one such form of excluding groups (on the grounds of age) for full citizenship. The links between ageism and citizenship are therefore the focal points of this paper.

Power, Age and Citizenship

The concept of power has been strongly and clearly linked to class in both marxist and non-marxist analyses (see, for example, Clegg, 1989, Giddens, 1971), to gender in feminist analysis (Mitchell, 1971) and to race/ethnicity within the anti-racist literature (Dominelli, 1988).

Power and age, however, have not been so readily linked, albeit with some notable exceptions, e.g. Phillipson (1982).

Life-chances, to use Weber’s term, are not randomly distributed within society. They can be seen to fall in line with structural social divisions. One of the primary divisions is that of socioeconomic class. Phillipson (1989) comments on the link between class and poverty in old age:-

“For the working-class elderly old age may be experienced not only as a period of extended poverty, but also as a time when, in comparison with those from middle-class professional occupations, there may be fewer opportunities for self-development. Old age, therefore, reproduces (and may indeed widen) class divisions created at earlier periods in the life cycle.” (p. 199)

Thus the marginalisation of working-class people continues into old age and the lesser economic power of this group will in many cases be intensified by the paucity of state pension provision by comparison with the superannuation-based schemes of professional and other middle-class workers and their dependents.

A class analysis linked to the material relations of production (Phillipson 1982) presents old age as a social construction. Retirement is used as a tool to regulate the labour market. As Phillipson and Walker (1986a) put it:-

“... age boundaries move according to labour market and demographic pressures.” (p. 286)

State policies discourage retirement at times of labour shortage but are indeed less discouraging at times when labour supply exceeds demand.

Old age, as defined constructed by the point of retirement, is therefore inversely related to economic power. The denigrating and demoralising effects of ageist ideology also serve to ensure that other forms of social power (status and prestige, for example) are seriously reduced for older people (Townsend, 1986).

This is further reinforced by the ageism inherent in the view that retired people are no longer productive and are thus a drain on society’s resources. Older people are characteristically portrayed in this negative light and this is further reflected in media presentations of elderly people (Victor, 1987, Chapter 5).

Even the welfare state, it is argued, is based on a fundamentally negative perspective on old age which subscribes to the ‘unproductive drain’ view of older people. Redding (1989) comments:-

“Beveridge’s welfare state assumed the elderly would be an ‘excess’, unproductive part of the population who could be provided for by a minimum guarantee of benefits - an idea which has underpinned the prevalent post war belief that elderly people are a ‘burden’ on the rest of us.” (p. i)

Given this scenario, it is not surprising that the practice of social welfare professionals with older people has been criticised as ageist and thus oppressive (Marshall, 1990, Phillipson and Strang, 1986). Social work is therefore to be viewed as a double-edged sword as far as the relationship between old age and power is concerned. The actions and attitudes of social workers, and the structures and policies on which these are premised, can therefore be either liberating and empowering (Mitchell, 1989) or discriminatory and oppressive.

Social workers deal with marginalised social groups and are thus in a key position to have an impact on increasing or decreasing the extent of such marginalisation. This is an issue of power, or more specifically empowerment. It is an important point and one to which I shall return below.

Townsend (1986) also links power and old age with the state. He examines the role of the state in producing and reinforcing ‘structured dependency’. He argues that the problems of powerlessness experienced by older people owe more to social, political and economic factors than to a natural process of ageing. This is a view echoed by Matthews (1979) when she comments on the social construction of old age:-

“The stereotypical old person is impoverished, socially isolated, and physically disabled, and at least in part, this is an accurate depiction. However, the accuracy stems not from the effects of the accumulation of years per se, but from current social arrangements, especially economic ones, that have placed the aged in a marginal position in relation to the ongoing social order.” (p. 55)

Indeed, the masking of the economic and sociopolitical dimensions under the guise of a biological or natural decline is an ideological device parallel with the ‘biology is destiny’ axiom of sexism and the ‘racial superiority’ fallacy of imperialism.

Ageist ideology is therefore a central part of the disempowerment of older people. But how, we must ask, does this relate to the notion of citizenship?

Citizenship can be seen as the relationship between the individual and the state and so hinges on a set of rights and duties. The negative and derogatory images of older people implicit in ageism have the effect of lowering expectations in respect of both rights and duties. For example, in terms of rights, it is often assumed by carers of elderly people that social services departments have the right to remove elderly people to residential care on a compulsory basis because they are ‘at risk’. Contrary to the dominance of such a belief, elderly people do have the right to remain in their own homes regardless of the degree of risk to which they are exposed (except where the Mental Health Act 1983 or Section 47 of the National Assistance Act 1948 apply). However, a right which is widely assumed not to exist is a severely weakened right. I shall return to this point below.

In this way the relationship between the state and the older citizen is seen as a paternalistic one in which individual autonomy is seen as subservient to the judgement of welfare professionals, acting on behalf of the state, as to ‘what is best’. There are elements here of both ‘infantilisation’ and ‘welfarism’, points which will be discussed below.

Similarly, in terms of duties, there are low expectations of older people; they are expected to ‘disengage’ from society (Cumming, 1963), to participate less as citizens. These expectations are powerful in their persuasiveness but leave older people less powerful especially as these expectations tend to be internalised by elderly people themselves. Brearley (1982) refers to Rosow (1974) who argues that:-

“... old people in industrialised society have little power, and are consequently devalued and devalue themselves. Older people, he suggests, are viewed in insidious stereotypes, are excluded from social opportunities, lose roles and confront severe role ambiguity in later life.” (p.13)

Brearley relates these issues to social exchange theory (Dowd, 1975, 1980) in which older people are constrained in terms of their relatively weaker position in social exchanges with younger people.

Older people are expected to receive more than they give and to submit to power more than they exercise it. They are constructed as weaker players in the interactional games of social life. Given this scenario, establishing full involvement and participation in one’s society is an uphill struggle. The social construction of old age dependency (Walker, 1987) and citizenship are therefore mutually exclusive.

Children as Citizens

So far, the consideration of the impact of discrimination based on age has focused on the older age group. However, similar processes can be seen to apply to people at the other end of the age spectrum - that is, to children. Ageism is primarily seen as discrimination against older people - indeed the definition of Fennell et al, quoted above states this explicitly - but it is important that age-based hegemony should be appreciated in its full range, including its impact on children.

If older people are described, albeit somewhat ironically, as ‘senior citizens’, we need to consider the position vis-a-vis citizenship of our junior citizens.

Arguments relating to the social construction of dependency in old age have their parallel in terms of the dependency of children. Both groups are subject to biological constraints in relation to independence especially as far as very elderly people or very young children are concerned. However, the ideology of ageism takes the biological dimension of a complex, multifaceted phenomenon and promotes it as the primary factor. In this way, childhood is presented as primarily a matter of biology, it is ‘natural’.

The child is presented as a growing organism to be nurtured and protected by the mother while the father acts as provider and protector for the family.

This traditional model has enjoyed considerable dominance in social work over a period of decades and has only relatively recently been challenged by the development of an anti-sexist perspective. (Hanmer and Statham, 1988).

One consequence of the traditional model is the overemphasis on the dependency of children and an underemphasis on children as unique human beings with the ability to make choices and exercise rights, (see John, 1988, for example).

If children are not to be excluded from the notion of citizenship we need to be clear about their rights and the ways in which notions of dependency affect such rights. It is clear that children begin life in an extremely dependent state. However, it is also clear that children become less dependent as they mature. The equation of childhood with a high level of dependency is therefore misleading, (Holt 1975). Dependency will vary in degree according to age and other circumstances. It will also vary in kind as there are many types of dependency (e.g., financial, emotional).

Ageist ideology, premised on the basis of a distorted social construction of childhood dependency, will therefore act as a barrier to the development of full citizenship. The comments of Righton (1989) support this point:-

“... the majority of children develop very rapidly the ability to contribute sensible views about what is in their best interests and by the age of early adolescence can match most adults in their capacity to make responsible decisions. In other words, their need for adult trusteeship in the matter of interests and rights tapers off close to vanishing point long before most parents - or other adults with authority over them - are prepared to relinquish it.” (in Morgan and Righton, 1989, p. 7)

Citizenship should therefore not be seen as a status acquired only when one ‘comes of age’. There will be times when children’s rights and children’s welfare will be in conflict especially as both the matter of rights and of welfare relate to values and are thus issues of power.

The ‘welfare principle’ on which child care social work is based clearly makes welfare a priority over rights thus creating a range of dilemmas and thorny issues for social workers and social care workers. An understanding of the nature and impact of ageist ideology is therefore an essential prerequisite for dealing with this area of social welfare practice.

Postman (1983) describes the ‘creation’ of childhood which he links to the development of the printing press and thus an emphasis on the need to learn to read. Prior to this, children were treated as ‘small adults’ not qualitatively different from the older generation. The fact that they could not read was not socially significant until the impact of the printing press.

Musgrove (1964) adopts a similar position in relation to the social construction of adolescence. Despite the biological emphasis placed on adolescence in influential works such as Erikson (1977), Musgrove sees this life-stage as primarily a social, rather than biological, construction.

Although not explicitly acknowledged, both Musgrove and Postman are addressing issues of ageism. They are referring to socially constructed life stages which help to retain power and influence in the hands of those who have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. The section below entitled ‘Multiple Oppressions’ will explore, to a limited extent at least, where such power lies.

Berger and Luckmann (1966) define ideology as ‘ideas serving as weapons for social interests’ (p. 18). Ageist ideology thus reinforces and legitimates the power of adults in relation to children and thereby renders the concept of children’s rights somewhat tokenistic.

Older People as Citizens

One of the frequently recognised rights of children is the right to protection. Child care legislation and child protection policies of local authorities and other agencies have produced a well-devel-oped set of mechanisms to protect children as far as possible.

Older people however, are not afforded such protection and can be left to suffer in a way which would not be tolerated in respect of children.

“Child abuse procedures are well established and carefully policed. The abuse of elderly people remains a neglected area in terms of practice and supportive literature.” (Thompson, 1989, p. ii)

This situation presents quite a dilemma in terms of how we perceive elderly people vis-a-vis children. On one hand, we do not wish to equate older people with children and thus contribute to the derogatory ageist practice of ‘infantilisation’ - treating older people as if they were children (Leonard, 1984) as, for example, in the ‘does she take sugar’ syndrome. On the other hand, however, the problem of the abuse of elderly people is a serious one, especially in relation to those older people who, by virtue of ill-health or disability, are largely dependent on others.

Eastman (1984) is critical of the lack of attention given to the ill-treatment of older people by over-stressed carers. Jerrome (1990) comments on the dangers of caring for without caring about:-

“... very occasionally caring for takes place in the absence of caring about. We are reminded by a growing literature on the abuse of elderly people by their families that negative feelings may dominate a care relationship with harmful consequences.” (in Bond and Colman, 1990, p. 195)

Citizenship for older people therefore depends on finding a balance between the right not to be treated as a child (avoiding infantilisation) and the right to protection (avoiding old age abuse).

Following on from the notion of protection from abuse, we need to consider the question of protection from risk. Here we are dealing with another fine balance - that between rights and risk (Norman, 1980).

Norman (1987) refers to:-

“... the ways in which elderly people’s dignity and opportunity for self-determination are often denied to them in the name of protecting them from risk.” (p. 14)

Whilst it is recognised that there is little point in ignoring risks, these need to be seen in the context of rights and dignity.

Reducing risk can have the effect of reducing rights, as, for example, in the extreme cases of compulsory removal from home under Section 47 of the National Assistance Act 1948 or compul-sory hospitalisation under the Mental Health Act 1983. In effect, what occurs is the assertion of the state’s rights to protect its vulnerable citizens but at the expense of the individual’s rights.

Where the risk is to other people, for example an elderly man suffering from Alzheimer’s Disease who is violent towards his partner, the issue of protection is perhaps less problematic. However, where the risk is to oneself, there is a classic philosophical dilemma. Does the state have the right to overrule the decision of an individual to accept what is seen by others as an unacceptable level of risk to self?

Current legislation only permits such an overruling where extremely unsanitary conditions exist (Section 47 of the National Assistance Act 1948) or where mental disorder obtains to such a degree as to render the person concerned a danger to self or others (Mental Health Act 1983). However, experienced practit-ioners are aware of the ways by which older people can be cajoled or pressured into giving up their rights,e.g. when the false ass-umption the ‘doctor’s orders’ have to be obeyed is not challenged.

Social welfare professionals need to make the decision - and it is a value-based decision - as to whether the priority is to be safeguarding rights and thus promoting citizenship or reducing risk, which may thus also involve undermining or ignoring rights.

In many cases, there is no conflict between rights and risk as there is a partnership between worker and client which seeks to reduce risk and so the consensual nature of the undertaking means that rights are not threatened. However, in those cases where there is conflict between worker and client over what constitutes an acceptable level of risk, the worker needs to be clear about which is the primary objective of intervention - reducing risk or safeguarding rights, even where this includes the right to die at home with dignity if necessary.

The concept of ‘quality of life’ is a very significant one in this context. The basic question can be posed in these terms: which scenario offers greater quality of life - one in which risk is reduced and citizenship undermined or one in which older people have the same rights as their younger counterparts to determine what level of risk to self they are prepared to tolerate?

Whilst the good intentions of social workers in seeking to protect elderly clients are not in doubt, it remains the case that a misguided zeal for reducing risk can have a profoundly ageist impact. This is, although such endeavours are clearly not ageist in intention, they are nonetheless ageist in effect.

In sum, the status of older people as citizens can be seen to be under threat at two levels, the general and the specific. At the general level, the marginalisation and dehumanisation inherent in ageist ideology raise barriers to participation in social and political life and this is further reinforced by the (often unwittingly) ageist practice of welfare professionals in their dealings with more vulnerable older people.

There is a parallel here with racism. Black people and people from ethnic minorities are subject to marginalisation at a general level (Rex, 1986) which is often intensified for clients by the racist structures and practices of welfare organisations. (Ahmad, 1990). One implication of this is that older people from ethnic minorities are subject to a double disadvantage, the combined discriminatory effects of both ageism and racism. It is this notion of combined or multiple oppressions to which I now turn.

Multiple Oppressions

Reference was made above to the intersection of issues of class and age. There are clear links, for example, between poverty and old age. These links have been intensified and highlighted by the growing dominance, over the past decade, of New Right ideology with its emphasis on personal responsibility, particularly in relation to preparing for one’s retirement - the growth of personal pension plans, combined with a reduction in SERPS, for example.

This emphasis on individual responsibility has the effect of ‘blaming the victim’ (Ryan 1971) by presenting structural factors (the lower earning power of people in socioeconomic classes IV and V) as matters of individual pathology or fecklessness. In effect, this is an extension of the traditional concept of the deserving versus undeserving poor (Ditch, 1987) and entails removing the responsibility for welfare from the collective level and placing it firmly at an individual level.

One of the consequences of this New Right individualism is the amplification of class differences. Those people whose socioeconomic position allows them to invest heavily in their old age will have a distinct advantage in later life over those who are less well equipped to do so.

This class distinction is further reflected in the relationship between class, age and power. As discussed above, old age is characterised, in general terms at least, by powerlessness and marginalisation. However, balanced against this is the existence of a small but significant minority of older people who are in very powerful positions - councillors, MPs, the judiciary, etc.

The dividing factor between the powerless majority and the powerful minority is of course that of class. The class background of the holders of power is a major factor as various studies have shown clear links between class membership and political and judicial power.

Norman (1985) also looks at issues of class and age but adds the further dimension of race/ethnicity. She describes the interaction of the three aspects as a form of ‘triple jeopardy’. Phillipson (1989) comments as follows:-

“This refers to the fact that ethnic elders not only face discrimination because they are old; in addition, many of them live in disadvantaged physical and economic circumstances; finally they are likely to face discrimination because of their culture, language, skin colour or religious affiliation.” (p. 203)

The marginalisation resulting from low income is reinforced and extended by the additional discriminatory impact of both racism and ageism.

This situation also needs to be addressed from a demographic point of view. Chakrabarti (1990) points out the lack of attention paid to demography as it affects social policy and black people. He comments:-

“Another factor the providers of social work service very seldom take into account is the demography of the black population in this country. As with all other public service provision, a lack of understanding of the nature and distribution of black people will inevitably lead to wrong or inappropriate policy formulation, which in turn will produce more dissatisfaction and injustice.” (p. 29)

He goes on to relate this weakness more specifically to the rapid growth in the older population and the services they will need:-

“... only a small proportion of black people - about 6 per cent - are over retirement age (the overall national figure is about 18 per cent). However, this particular situation will start changing dramatically towards the end of this century, and it appears that very few public institutions are anywhere near taking this demographic factor into serious consideration with the context of relevant policy formulation.” (p.30)

The number of people affected by ‘triple jeopardy’ will continue to rise and so a failure on the part of policy makers and service providers to take this into account and plan appropriately can be seen as a discriminatory action - not in terms of commission but of omission.

Discrimination on the grounds of gender can also combine with ageism to produce what Sontag (1978) terms the ‘double standard of ageing’. Ford and Sinclair (1989) comment:-

“Women’s experience of old age is both qualitatively and quantitatively different from that of men. While all older people are subject to the discriminatory and demeaning process of ageism, women suffer additional disadvantages because of their low status, their traditional role(s), their lack of economic power and because the majority of them live alone.” (in Carter et al., 1989, p.74)

Once again there is a demographic dimension to this combination of oppressive forces. Peace (1986) points out that the vast majority of older people are women (over two-thirds of those over 75 years) and so the impact of sexism applies to a much wider proportion of this age group than the general population. The double disadvantage of ageism and sexism is well captured in the opening sentence of Peace’s paper:-

“It would appear that in our society old women are all around us and yet invisible - invisible in that their existence is seldom acknowledged; their needs are seldom recognised and their voices seldom heard.” (in Phillipson and Walker, 1986b, p.61)

A further combination of oppressions is that of ageism and disablism (Oliver, 1983) but here we must tread carefully. One common ageist assumption is that old age is characterised by frailty and disability. However, as Qureshi and Walker (1986) remind us, the vast majority of elderly people are able to cope unsupported and so we need to be wary of equating old age with disability.

Nonetheless, for many older people some degree of physical impairment does lead to disability and so the discrimination and negative stereotyping of the able-bodied majority are experienced in additon to the oppressive effects of ageism.

A further ageist assumption of relevance to the notion of multiple oppressions is that of the asexual nature of old age. Whilst the myth that sexuality does not feature in old age persists, many sexually active older people will feel oppressed and alienated by the commonly held view that sexuality is only for younger people (Victor, 1987).

However, for gay and lesbian older people, this denial of sexuality can attenuate the ‘heterosexism’ to which they are already subject (GLC, 1985).

Webb (1989) gives an example of this from a residential home for elderly people:-

“... accepting homosexuality was difficult enough if the person was young. If they were old, there was deliberate denial, even revulsion. Two women residents who loved and cared for one another were deliberately kept apart by staff. They were not allowed to share a room, even though this was their wish, and they were deliberately placed apart in the day room, unable to move nearer because of their disabilities.” (p.20)

We could go on almost indefinitely, detailing the combinations of different oppressions, especially as they intersect with ageism. However, the point has hopefully been clearly made by now that ageism is not simply another form of discrimination to be ‘tagged on’ to the more established issues of racism and sexism. Indeed, cleavages in society’s structure do not occur in isolation but articulate with one another. Ageism is an important dimension of this complex matrix of multiple oppressions.

Each of these oppressions has the effect of disempowering the people to whom it applies and thus stands in the way of citizenship. Where two or more of such oppressions combine, even greater barriers to citizenship are erected.

The Implications for Welfare Practice

In 1986, Ric Bowl asked the questions: ‘Can a progressive social work with old people be constructed? What would it look like?’ (p. 137). These are major questions and we can only begin to scratch the surface here. However, some key pointers towards a social welfare practice more attuned to citizenship can be identified, in outline at least.

Anti-ageism must be recognised as a key part of anti-discriminatory policy and practice alongside anti-racism and anti-sexism.
Social work practice must be geared towards empowerment of older people rather than simply reducing risk. Reducing risk whilst also reducing rights, dignity and self-esteem is more of a disservice than a service.
Social work with older people must not be dismissed as routine or uninteresting (Thompson, 1989) nor should it be reserved for social work assistants or other unqualified staff.
Social work staff will need to come to terms with their own negative feelings and stereotypes towards older people and confront other people’s ageism as and when it arises.
Institutional ageism needs to be recognised and confronted wherever possible. Social workers have a role to play in developing and channelling services as well as delivering them and so discriminatory services and institutional practices can be challenged.
Greater consumer participation needs to be encouraged in order to undermine the social construction of dependency and thereby reduce stigmatisation. Child care work now promotes the notion of partnership and so too can social work with older people.
The concept of dependency needs to be replaced by that of ‘interdependency’ (Phillipson, 1989). Citizenship is premised on mutual care and support and collective responsibility. Thus we should seek to replace the weakness and inadequacy implicit in the notion of dependency with the strength and empowerment of interdependency.

This is, of course, by no means an exhaustive list and much work remains to be done to translate anti-ageist theory into the reality of day-to-day practice. (See also Phillipson and Walker, 1986a, Phillipson, 1989, Scrutton, 1989)

Conclusion

This paper has sought to draw attention to the effects of ageist ideology, structures and practices on undermining citizenship through the process of marginalisation, dehumanisation and disempowerment.

The main focus has been on the impact of ageism on the citizenship of older people although some attention has also been paid to the parallel situation of children as they too are affected by the oppressive consequences of a society which prioritises the needs of wealth-producing adults.

Ageism combines with, and accentuates, the negative effects of other social cleavages such as race/ethnicity, gender, class, differential ability and sexual orientation. Citizenship is under-mined by oppression and, within the context of a complex and intricate web of multiple oppressions, it is further undermined.

Social policy in general and social welfare practice in particular play a key role in mediating the relationship between age and citizenship. Policy and practice can reinforce and maintain ageism by perpetuating negative stereotypes (e.g. through infantilisation). On the other hand, however, policy and practice can be anti-discriminatory and anti-oppressive by challenging and undermining ageism in its various manifestations.

If the goal of citizenship is realistically to be pursued, all those involved in the welfare field will need to take whatever steps poss-ible to ensure that their actions contribute as much as possible to the latter whilst contributing fully to the demise of the former.

In short, researchers, educators, managers and practitioners in the social welfare fields need to share with Gladys Elder ...

“A general recognition that the old are alienated by our society and the acceptance of the elderly as people - little can be achieved until this important fact has been assimilated.” (1977, p. 15)

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